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Is displacement possible without
language? Evidence from preverbal
infants and chimpanzees
Valentina Cuccio and Marco Carapezza1
Is displacement possible without language? This question was addressed in a recent work
by Liszkowski and colleagues (Liszkowski, Schafer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). The
authors carried out an experiment to demonstrate that 12-month-old prelinguistic infants
can communicate about absent entities by using pointing gestures, while chimpanzees
cannot. The main hypothesis of their study is that displacement does not depend on
language but is, however, exclusively human and instead depends on species-specific
social-cognitive human skills. Against this hypothesis, we will argue that a symbolic
representation is needed to intentionally communicate absence and that this symbolic
representation is tied to language. Moreover, data on the expression of displacement in
home-sign systems will be taken into consideration. In light of this data, and in opposition
to Liszkowski et al.’s (2009) claim, this paper will argue that displacement gestures are not
foundational to language. Instead, they predate and predict the expression of complex
forms of negation because they are specifically foundational to them.
Keywords: Displacement; Negation; Prelinguistic Infants’ Gestures
1. Introduction
Displacement is a distinctive feature of human language. We currently do not have any
proof that displacement is possible without language. That is to say, we are not certain
that any animal other than man uses an intentional communication system with
displacement, even if there seems to be evidence that nonhuman primate vocalizations
(Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003) or bees’ dances (Von Frisch, 1967) might intentionally
communicate about an absent referent. However, empirical evidence suggests that
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these examples do not demonstrate that chimpanzees or bees have the intention of
communicating about absent entities.
In the case of primate vocalizations, the vocalization is a reaction to the presence of
a predator; these vocalizations, as well as other non-vocal primates’ signals, appear to
be involuntary responses to emotional states. They cannot be considered as intentional
signals even though they successfully communicate the cause of the primate’s
emotional state, i.e., the presence of a predator. Moreover, the repertoire of these
vocalizations is fixed, no new vocalizations can be learned (Cartmill, Beilock, &
Goldin-Meadow, 2012; Cartmill & Maestripieri, 2011; Snowdon & Hausberger, 1997).
In the case of the bees’ dance, this behavior does not seem to involve an intentional
attempt to direct others’ attention to an absent referent because honeybees do not
seem to have any capacity for inferential intention recognition, even though their
dance successfully transmits information to others (Wharton, 2009; Wilson &
Wharton, 2006). The bees’ dance is also a highly fixed and unambiguous code that can
be considered an example of an information transmission system without
communicative intentions.
Thus, these examples of non-vocal primates’ signals and bees’ dances suggest that
non-intentional communicative signals can be detached from the here-and-now
context. However, these signals cannot be considered examples of intentional
communication. Hence, displacement, defined as the intentional detachment from the
here-and-now context for communicative purposes, seems to be exclusively human.
Other forms of non-intentional displacement will not be addressed here since this
paper is strictly focused on the expression of displacement in intentional
communicative behaviors.
Is displacement, considered as an expression of intentional communication,
possible without language? This question was addressed in a recent work by
Liszkowski, Schafer, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009). The authors carried out an
experiment to demonstrate that prelinguistic infants can communicate about absent
entities by using pointing gestures, while chimpanzees cannot. Indeed, in the task
given in this study, prelinguistic infants and chimpanzees could obtain a desirable
object (toys or food) by requesting it from the experimenter. Requests were carried out
by pointing to the object. In the absent-referent condition, the location that usually
had held the object was empty. Prelinguistic infants successfully acquired the object by
pointing to the empty location. Only the infants were able to point to the empty
location to request the object. The authors interpreted these pointing gestures as
expressions of displacement. The main hypothesis of the study is that displacement
does not depend on language but is exclusively human and, instead, depends on
species-specific social-cognitive human skills.
In response to Liszkowski et al.’s hypothesis, we claim that a symbolic representation
is needed to intentionally communicate absence, and that this symbolic representation
is tied to language. Metonymy, a specific kind of symbolization, seems to be
particularly at play here. Infants are representing the content (the object) through the
container (the empty location that had held it). Thus, language seems to be necessary
to express displacement. Moreover, even if the infants of Liszkowski et al.’s study are
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said to be preverbal, it is worth noting that they are 12-month-old children. They may
not yet be speakers, but being preverbal is not the same as being prelinguistic. In other
words, a 12-month-old infant can already show linguistic features in his or her
communication even if he or she is not yet able to speak verbally.
Even though 12-month-old infants are usually not active speakers, they already have
a high level of language comprehension. Liszkowski et al. (2009) do not consider the
well-known fact that linguistic measurements based on production largely
underestimate the real level of linguistic comprehension (Adamson, 1996; Benedict,
1979; Bloom, 2000; Ganea, 2005; Goldin-Meadow, Seligman, & Gelman, 1976;
Huttenlocher, 1974; Ninio, 1993; Saylor & Baldwin, 2004; Woodward, Markman, &
Fitzsimmons, 1994). In addition, the authors do not take into account studies on
infant comprehension of displaced speech. These studies have largely shown that
infants are already able to comprehend displacement expressions in spoken language
around their first birthday (Gallerani, Saylor, & Adwar, 2009; Ganea, 2005; Ganea &
Saylor, 2012; Huttenlocher, 1974; Osina, Saylor, & Ganea, 2012; Saylor, 2004).
In order to assess the hypothesis that displacement gestures do not depend on
language, it follows that Liszkowski et al.’s concepts of linguistic and prelinguistic
communication must be understood. Although the authors do not offer any explicit
definition, some definitions would be essential to identifying the boundaries between
what is linguistic and what is not linguistic. In a recent paper by Liszkowski, Brown,
Callaghan, Takada, and de Vos (2012), the authors propose a list of distinctive and
species-specific features of human prelinguistic gestural communication. These
features should define what counts as prelinguistic communication. For each of them,
the authors claim that direct empirical evidence has been provided.
According to the authors, prelinguistic pointing gestures in 12-month-old infants
predict first-word onset and vocabulary growth as reliably as the onset of syntactic
two-word combinations (and, importantly, in 12-month-old infants, pointing
gestures are already combined with words in one-gesture and one-word
combinations). Moreover,
prelinguistic infants of 12 months of age point in meaningful ways, based on social-
cognitive skills and motivations; . . . . 12-month-olds point to communicate about
specific entities and events, even when these are absent from the perceptual scene;
. . . before infants produce point-word combinations, they comprehend the
underlying referential nature of these combinations, and it is the specific canonical
form of index-finger pointing (as opposed to whole-hand pointing) that first
embodies a bidirectional understanding of the underlying communicative
intentions of the act. (Liszkowski et al., 2012, p. 2)
Considering that the gestures of 12 month-old-infants have many defining
characteristics of language, and that they carry out functions that will be later carried
out in language (syntactic combinations, meaningfulness and reference based on
socio-cognitive abilities, mutual identification of communicative intentions,
displacement), what is, then, really new and specific about language? Prelinguistic
communication already shows most of the defining traits of linguistic communi-
cation, and this makes the task of identifying the boundaries between linguistic and
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prelinguistic communication quite difficult, in particular at the onset of intentional
communicative behaviors. On the basis of this evidence, we might even be able to
question whether it is possible to identify a sharp boundary between linguistic and
prelinguistic communication when dealing with 12-month-old children growing up in
a linguistic and symbolic world without giving any measure of their level of linguistic
comprehension.
Looking carefully at the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study, in the authors’ view, the
boundary between linguistic and prelinguistic communication can be distinguished
through the use of conventional “tools.” However, we will see that abstract pointing
gestures can be considered the result of an agreement between interlocutors and, as
such, they can be considered, to a certain extent, arbitrary and conventional.
The symbolic and arbitrary nature of this gesture is based on the peculiar
relationship that it entails. A triadic relationship between the gesture (the
representamen or sign), the interpretation of the sign (the interpretant), and a third
entity not present in the scene (the toy) is entailed by the gesture studied by Liszkowski
et al. Thus, this relationship is neither iconic nor indexical but arbitrary in nature. In
fact, there is neither similarity (iconic relationship) nor physical contiguity (indexical
relationship) between the displacement gesture and the toy as the toy is not present in
the scene. The relationship between the gesture and the toy is arbitrarily established, in
this case on the spot, by the child and the experimenter. The abstract pointing gesture
signifies the absent toy only because it is interpreted as such. If, following Liszkowski
et al. (2009), the use of conventional means delimits the boundary between linguistic
and prelinguistic communication, then the abstract pointing gesture can be
considered conventional in the sense that it is neither iconic nor indexical but
arbitrary and conventional, because it is the product of a form of agreement between
two interlocutors. The conventionality of language relies on this kind of relationship.
Furthermore, the expression of signs that rely on this relationship is already a
manifestation of linguistic communication, even before the onset of speech
production.
Moreover, the peculiar symbolic nature of this gesture does not rely only on the
arbitrary relationship that it entails. In fact, as Deacon (1997) has pointed out,
arbitrarity cannot be the only feature of symbolic representation. The nature of
symbolic reference also relies on the relationship between signs in a system. That is, the
symbolic relationship between a sign and its referent is mediated by the relationship
between that sign and the other signs of that system. Furthermore, symbolic reference
is also hierarchically built on the structure of iconic and indexical relationships
(Deacon, 1997; Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1978). Now, if we return to the gestures
produced in Liszkowski et al.’s (2009) study, we can observe that the abstract pointing
that occurs in the absence of its physical referent (the toy) becomes a representation of
the concrete pointing that occurred when the object was present. Thus, we can only
interpret the abstract pointing gesture through its reference to the previous concrete
pointing. Hence, the relationship between the abstract pointing and its referent (the
absent toy) is mediated by the relationship between the abstract pointing and the
previous concrete pointing. The indexical relationship is recoded and now requires a
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higher level of interpretation. For this reason, displacement gestures seem to be
symbolic (Peirce, 1868).
On the other hand, animal communication systems, even when they are intentional,
are not arbitrary, and do not entail systematic relationships between the signs of a
system. Sign systems in animal communicative behaviors do not have any space for
negotiation, nor are they the product of a mutual agreement between sign users.
Thus, the only conclusion we can draw from studies on infant gestural
communication is that concrete deictic pointing gestures, that are not yet symbolic
since they are indexical and have a relationship of physical contiguity with objects, are
incontrovertible evidence of a prelinguistic gestural basis for linguistic intentional
communication. However, this same conclusion cannot be drawn in relation to
abstract pointing gestures. Indeed, when we are dealing with symbolic gestures, as the
case seems to be for displacement gestures, we are already beyond the boundary of
language. So, the question to pose to Liszkowski et al. (2009) is why a word can count
as language and a gesture cannot, even though a symbolic representation seems to
underlie both of them. A definition of what counts as a symbolic gesture will be
provided in the next section.
2. Symbolic Gestures
Different types of gestures, fulfilling different functions, have been observed. Roughly,
they can be classified into at least three main types: deictic; representational; and
pragmatic gestures (O¨zc!alıs¸kan & Goldin-Meadow, 2009; Pizzuto & Capobianco,
2005). Deictic gestures, such as pointing, are used to identify objects in the immediate
environment and usually rely on contextual information. That is, the referent is
present in the utterance context and it is necessary to introspect this context to
disambiguate the gesture’s meaning. For this reason, Pizzuto and Capobianco (2005)
argue that deictic gestures are not yet symbolic. It may be said that this kind of gesture
fits the Peircean description of indexes. In fact, it is characterized by a physical
contiguity between the gesture and its referent.
On the other hand, the authors assert that representational gestures are symbolic,
independently of their iconic, metaphoric, or conventional origin, because they are
“content-loaded”; that is, they have an intrinsic meaning, and rely on shared
background knowledge between producer and comprehender to be interpreted. While
conventional gestures are culturally specific and stored in a gestural lexicon, iconic and
metaphoric gestures are usually generated on the spot (Cartmill et al., 2012).
Adapting the Pizzuto and Capobianco (2005) definition of representational gestures
to the aims of this paper, only a “content-loaded” gesture that has an arbitrary and
conventional relationship between itself, its referent, and its interpretant will be
considered as symbolic. This relationship has to be established by means of a usage-
based process of mutual identification of communicative intentions. That is, the sign
signifies its referent only because it is interpreted to signify it, and importantly, the
interpretation of the sign relies on its relationship with the other signs of the system.
Philosophical Psychology 5
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Finally, pragmatic gestures are produced to stress the interaction between
participants, to structure the discourse, or to perform speech acts.
In light of this revised classification, the basic definition of symbolic gesture that has
been proposed here also holds true for abstract deictic gestures, namely deictic
gestures such as pointing, used to indicate something not physically present in the
context of speech. Abstract deictic gestures can be used to “show” a concept, a
relationship, a point of view, or an abstract property, and they can be used
metonymically. For example, we can point to a man to refer to an idea in which that
man believes or we can point to an object to refer to an abstract property referable to
that object. We can also point to a location to refer to what that location has previously
held, like the infants did in the Liszkowski and colleagues’ study. These gestures entail a
conventional relationship, even though they do not rely on fixed couplings between
signs and their referent.
It is worth noting that even in “highly conventional” spoken languages, the
semantic level alone, i.e., the pre-fixed conventional coupling of words and referents, is
not sufficient to succeed in communicative exchanges. The distinction proposed by
Grice (1969; Gibbs, 2002) between what is literally said and what is implicated by the
utterance of a sentence in itself suggests that semantics and compositionality rules are
not sufficient to understand linguistic activity. A second pragmatic step of language
comprehension seems to be necessary. In this account, symbolic communication is
arbitrary and conventional in its nature, but the arbitrary relationship does not need
to be highly coded and pre-fixed. The arbitrary relationship is built in the context of
utterance, being always the result of a pragmatic process (Barlow & Kemmer, 2000;
Carapezza & Biancini, forthcoming). Moreover, these communicative processes do
not necessarily entail consciousness. On the contrary, according to Sperber andWilson
(1995) they are mostly implicit and unconscious.
Imagine two friends that meet in a pub. The first sees the other and says, “hey, I did
it!” and the other answers: “congratulations.” This conversation can only be
understood by someone who shares the same background knowledge as the
participants. For example, the man could have gotten married or could have divorced,
could have gotten a new job or could have quit his old one . . . and so on. In each
different context, the very same words would have a very different meaning. However,
these words are not less arbitrary nor less symbolic for this reason. Thus, even “content
loaded” words or gestures need to be pragmatically determined, the arbitrary
relationship being built or re-built in every context of utterance. We don’t have
symbolic signs without this agreement. Abstract deictic gestures seem to have the same
needs, consequentially making them far more complex than concrete deictic gestures.
Conventional and highly standardized couplings between words and gestures, on
the one hand, and their referents, on the other, are higher products of this same ability
to symbolize. Symbolic communication in gesture is the early expression of this
species-specific ability. Hence, symbolic gesture should be thought of as the early
manifestation of language, with language understood as a multimodal system
(Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992, 2005) that includes gestures and non-manual
behaviors as meaningful units. Considering that the displacement gesture of very
6 V. Cuccio and M. Carapezza
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young infants can be characterized by the same features that characterize symbolic
representations in adult linguistic communication, it does not seem correct to say that
they do not rely on language. Although they might not rely on pre-fixed conventional
semantics, they still seem to rely on linguistic skills.
3. Methodological Issues
In addition to the considerations provided in the previous section, we also wish to
make some methodological remarks about the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study. It is
worth noting that the pieces of evidence that will be discussed in this section can be
considered as independent arguments in support of the claim that displacement
gestures rely on language, and they may be appealing to readers who are not satisfied
with the definition of symbolic gesture sketched earlier.
The first objection that can be raised against Liszkowski et al.’s (2009) hypothesis is
that, despite the fact that the infants in the study are said to be preverbal, no measures
of their verbal abilities, either in production or in comprehension, are reported by the
authors. Even if the 12-month-old infants of the study were not yet active in language
production, they could have already had (and probably did have) a good level of
language comprehension. Indeed, when 12-month-old infants use pointing gestures to
refer to an absent entity, they already show a good level of language comprehension.
For example, Caselli, Rinaldi, Stefanini, and Volterra (2012) recently collected and
analyzed data about early action/gesture vocabulary and its relationship with spoken
vocabulary in both the production and comprehension of 492 Italian children with an
age ranging from 8 to 18 months. They found that the transition from the action/
gesture vocabulary and spoken language is mediated by word comprehension. Thus,
to say that the infants were preverbal without any measure of their level of language
production and comprehension is a methodological mistake.
In this regard, it is even more striking to note that Liszkowski et al. (2009) do not
consider the fact that many experimental studies have been carried out specifically on
the ability of very young infants to comprehend displaced speech (Gallerani et al.,
2009; Ganea, 2005; Ganea & Saylor, 2012; Huttenlocher, 1974; Osina et al., 2012;
Saylor, 2004). These studies suggest that 11- or 12-month-old infants can already
understand displaced expressions in spoken language even if they only start to actively
produce them at around 18 months of age (Sachs, 1983). At the beginning, this ability
heavily relies on many factors such as contextual cues, the level of familiarity infants
have with the absent entity, and especially, the temporal contiguity between the
displaced speech and the last appearance of the absent entity (Ganea, 2005; Ganea &
Saylor, 2012). In other words, at the very beginning, infants comprehend displaced
speech more easily when it refers to entities that were physically or temporally
contiguous. For example, if there is a long delay between the last appearance of an
absent entity and the utterance of the displaced expression, then infants can fail in
rehearsing the representation of the referent while they do not fail in no-delay
conditions (Ganea & Saylor, 2012).
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As Ganea and Saylor (2012, p. 1) pointed out, the ability to bring to mind an absent
referent depends on different factors such as general representational abilities,
contextual support, the strength of the relationship between a word and its referent,
and the strength of the memory representation of the referent. In any case, these
findings on the ability of 12-month-old infants to comprehend displaced speech are in
themselves an argument against Liszkowski et al.’s (2009) study. In fact, this data
suggests that, despite the presence of some constraints, even in the case of weak
representational abilities, infants as young as 11 or 12 months can comprehend
displaced speech in appropriate conditions. Again, the strength of this argument is
independent of the definition of symbolic gesture that has been provided in the
previous section.
For example, in Ganea (2005), we can find a more deflationist explanation of word
comprehension in 12-month-old infants that relies much less on complex pragmatic
abilities. This explanation, and all the experiments that support it, suggest that very
young infants around their first birthday comprehend spoken displaced expressions.
That is to say, language is already there and we are not justified in concluding that
displaced gesture does not depend on language or, at least, we cannot rule out the
possibility that linguistic competence, in a broad sense, has a role in the production of
displaced gestures.
A second methodological remark concerns the fact that the authors do not report all
of the needed information about the communicative context in which the infants
produced their pointing gestures. It would be important, for example, to know
whether the infants produced only gestures or gestures and vocalizations. Indeed, as
Pizzuto and Capobianco (2005, p. 185) noted, young infants starting from 10 or 12
months of age are able to produce two-element utterances. In this very early stage,
infants can produce bimodal equivalent utterances and supplementary or
complementary utterances. Bimodal equivalent utterances combine two represen-
tational units, or a deictic gesture and a vocalization. In this latter case, the two
elements convey the same information and they are often considered as one-element
utterances. On the other hand, in the case of complementary or supplementary
utterances, each element of the utterance contributes in a peculiar way to specify the
meaning of the other element. Complementary utterances usually have a single
referent which is addressed both by a deictic and a representational gesture. Each of
these gestures contributes to the disambiguation of the referent. Supplementary
utterances can address one or two referents and each element of the utterance adds
specific information to the meaning of the utterance.
All of these types of two-element utterances are produced by 12-month-old infants.
However, in the very early stages, from 12 to 16 months, bimodal equivalent
utterances are by far the most frequent type produced. In this highly frequent behavior
in early communication, both the gestural and the vocal modality combine to fulfill
the function of the utterance. In particular, in this type of combination, a deictic
gesture (e.g., pointing) can be accompanied by a vocalization, since both elements are
involved in performing the same illocutionary function of that utterance. This early
interrelationship between vocal and gestural modalities is not acknowledged by
8 V. Cuccio and M. Carapezza
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Liszkowski and colleagues to the extent that the possibility of vocalizations
accompanying gesture production is not even mentioned in their study. However, as it
is elsewhere noted (Liszkowski et al., 2012), vocalizations accompanying gestures can
provide additional cues to the interlocutor to use in understanding the infants’
communicative exchange. Moreover, this early combination of modalities is
significant for the further development of a multimodal language.
A third methodological remark concerns the procedure of the experiment. Before
the trials, participants watched demonstrations where requests were carried out by
means of specific or unspecific linguistic requests (e.g., “I want a ball” or “give me
something” when a ball was present) and with the production of gestures (not
pointing gestures, but facial or other manual gestures). The aim of the demonstration
was to induce children to produce specific and referential requests. According to the
authors, requests were carried out linguistically because a silent adult’s interaction
would have been unnatural. If the infants did not comprehend language at all, every
sentence would have worked in the same way. Why did the authors use correct
linguistic requests? This is another methodological mistake. Indeed, if infants
understand the aim of the demonstration, we cannot rule out the possibility that they
comprehend language. In other words, linguistic displaced expressions are an integral
part of the warm-up trials and if children understand the demonstration, we cannot
exclude the possibility that they already comprehend linguistic displacement.
Accordingly, the authors of the study are not entitled to draw their conclusions.
4. Gestures and Speech in Language Development
Some interesting facts about the linguistic nature of abstract pointing gestures have
been revealed by studies on language development. If we look at studies on the
acquisition of language, we will see that the symbolic gesture is an early form of
communication that even occur before first words (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1985; Bates,
1976; Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979; Iverson, Capirci, &
Caselli, 1994). Deictic gestures such as ritualized request, giving, showing, and
pointing are produced early on. Infants start to produce deictic gestures directed
towards objects present in the here-and-now context at about nine months of age
(Bates, 1976; Bates et al., 1979; Lock, 1978; Volterra & Erting, 1994; Caselli et al.,
2012). The first referential gestures can be produced both in isolation or in
combination with other gestures (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Bates et al., 1979;
Volterra, Caselli, Capirci, & Pizzuto, 2003). Also, as many studies have pointed out,
children start to use pointing gestures productively at about 12 months of age or even
earlier (Antinoro Pizzuto & Capobianco, 2008; Capirci, Iverson, Pizzuto, & Volterra,
1996; Caselli et al., 2012; Lock, 1978; Pizzuto & Capobianco, 2005; Volterra & Erting,
1994).
These gestures precede the acquisition of vocal deixis in language development
(Bates, 1976; Bates et al., 1979; Butcher & Goldin-Meadow, 2000; Caselli et al., 2012;
Lock, 1978; Volterra & Erting, 1994). Representational gestures follow immediately
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after (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1985; Bates, 1976; Bates et al., 1979; Caselli et al., 2012;
Iverson, Capirci, & Caselli, 1994), and the onset of gesture and speech integration
occurs shortly after that, at about 14 months of age (Butcher & Goldin-Meadow,
2000). Thus, speech and gesture can already be considered a unified system in the one-
word period of language acquisition. The integration between the two modalities will
be fully mastered by the two-word period.
According to Butcher and Goldin-Meadow (2000), speech and gesture are
integrated in a unified system when their relationship shows the defining features of
adult usage: semantic coherence (combining gestures with meaningful and related
speech) and temporal synchrony (producing a gesture in synchrony with speech). The
integration between speech and gesture becomes progressively more complex, as
infants progress from complementary to supplementary gesture-speech combinations
(Butcher & Goldin-Meadow, 2000; O¨zc!alıs¸kan & Goldin-Meadow, 2009; Pizzuto &
Capobianco, 2005). In light of these findings, 12-month-old infants in the Liszkowski
et al.’s study can hardly be considered prelinguistic. Indeed, they are already producing
abstract pointing gestures that are much more complex and cognitively more
demanding than concrete pointing gestures. Thus, summarizing the data discussed so
far, it is possible to say that “symbolic gestures tend to develop in tandem with the
child’s early words” (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 1989, p. 450), and that they are often
preceded by the acquisition of a high level of language comprehension.
The link between gesture production and later linguistic development has been
analyzed by many researchers (Bates, 1976; Bates et al., 1979; Goldin-Meadow &
Butcher, 2003; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005; O¨zc!alıs¸kan & Goldin-Meadow, 2005,
2009). Their findings have widely shown that gesture production predates and paves
the way for speech development. This suggests that the gestures performed by 10–12
month-old infants are already carrying out linguistic functions because gesture and
speech are a single integrated system (McNeill, 1992; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005,
p. 370).
The interaction between speech and gesture is a topic that has been widely
addressed. Different accounts have been proposed to explain the role of gesture
(Hadar, Wenkert-Olenik, Krauss, & Soroker, 1998; Kendon, 1980, 2004; Kita &
Ozyurek, 2003; Krauss & Hadar, 1999; McNeill, 1992, 2005). However, in each of
these theories, gesture is functionally tied to speech. Language, then, starts with
gestures and words, and as a lot of research suggests, it appears to be multimodal
(e.g., Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992, 2000, 2005). Thus, gesture should be thought of
as being part of language. Paradoxically, there seems to be a bias in the Liszkowski
et al. (2009) study that consists in their identification of language mainly with
speech because, following the authors’ argument, we can find conventional means in
spoken expressions.
So, if gestures predict linguistic changes, anticipating linguistic functions that will
later spread to the speech modality, the problem remains the identification of the
beginning of language. When can we say that a child starts to learn language? Only
when he or she says his or her first word? Only when he or she combines two words for
the first time? Can symbolic gestures be considered the starting point of language
10 V. Cuccio and M. Carapezza
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learning? Can language comprehension, before active production, be considered the
starting point for the process of language acquisition? Depending on the answers given
to these questions, gestures expressing displacement could be considered as being
deeply involved in language, and infant displacement gestures could be considered as
reliant on language, even if infants are not yet active speakers.
5. Gestures and the Acquisition of Negation in Home-Sign Languages
In this section, we present a final argument concerning the production of
displacement gesture and negation in home-sign systems. This section is a discussion
of a piece of evidence presented by Liszkowski et al. (2009) in the last part of their
article.
It is well known that negation is another distinctive and universal feature of human
language (Horn, 2010). Every human language includes negation, but to date we do
not know of any animal communication system that has negation (although some
forms of rejection have been identified). Negation and displacement seem to be
connected in some way. Indeed, often displacement is entailed by the expression of
linguistic negation. The topic of the connection between negation and displacement
will be addressed here in relation to home-sign systems. In fact, in the Liszkowski et al.
(2009) study, the authors concluded their work by briefly presenting and discussing
the displacement gestures produced by a deaf child of hearing parents. Although the
child was not exposed to conventional language, he started to use displacement
gestures. This was a proof, according to Liszkowski et al. (2009), that exposure to
language is not necessary for displacement.
Two main objections can be made to Liszkowski and colleagues’ argument. First, it
should be noted that the child used displacement gestures in a home-sign system that
he developed with his parents. This communication system is already symbolic and
tied to the faculty of language. Second, there is evidence that even negation, a unique
and distinctive characteristic of human language, can be expressed in home-sign
systems. Negation cannot be expressed without language. As a consequence, home-
sign systems that can express both displacement and negation are not proof of the fact
that exposure to language is not necessary for displacement.
Concerning the first objection, following Goldin-Meadow (1993), a home-sign
language could be considered, at least, as an intentional communication system
realized by means of shared symbols. Gestures produced in home-sign systems have
some of the defining features of language. In fact, they may be regarded as clues that
trigger a process of communication by means of a mutual recognition of
communicative intentions, relying on some kind of shared background knowledge
between speakers. The bigger the community is that uses these gestures, the more
standardized and conventional they will become. Hence, even in a very small
community, such as a family, symbolic gestures are shared by the community and
entail an arbitrary relationship in the sense that they are the product of forms of
implicit agreement between the interlocutors.
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Home-sign systems are spontaneously created by deaf children and their non-
signing relatives to make everyday communication possible. This means that deaf
children are not exposed to any conventional sign language because they are not part
of a deaf community. However, although home-sign languages are not handed down
from generation to generation, being created anew in each familiar context, they
present many of the core features of natural languages in their morphology and syntax
(Franklin, Giannakidou, & Goldin-Meadow, 2011). For this reason, home-sign
languages have been presented by Chomskian linguists as evidence of an innate
language module. Deaf children, despite the fact that they are not exposed to any
natural sign language, create symbolic systems with many of the core properties of
natural languages.
Interestingly, Franklin et al. (2011) suggest that home-sign languages are often the
roots of conventional sign languages. This is well documented, for example, in the case
of Nicaraguan Sign Language. However, even if we put aside the complex and widely
disputed hypothesis of an innate module, home-sign languages still present many
characteristic features of natural languages. Hence, if home-sign systems have many
core properties of natural languages, despite the fact that they are not full languages,
displacement gesture in home-sign languages cannot be convincingly presented as
evidence that displacement does not depend on language. It would be impressive if the
child mentioned by Liszkowski et al. (2009) had used abstract pointing gestures
outside of any intentional symbolic communication, but this seems not to be the case.
Home-sign systems are already a form of symbolic communication and need to be
shared by a larger community to become highly conventional languages.
In summary, according to Liszkowski et al. (2009), home-sign systems can be
considered as an argument in favor of the fact that displacement gestures do not rely
on language because children using these systems are able to express displacement
gestures even though they are not exposed to any conventional language. However,
these communication systems display many undoubtedly linguistic properties and,
since they show linguistic properties, it is not possible to say that exposure to language
is not occurring.
The second objection to Liszkowski and colleagues’ argument is addressed in the
rest of this section. In particular, we will focus on the expression of negation in home-
sign systems. The aim of this section is to show that even home-sign systems express
complex and specifically linguistic structures such as negation. The presence of
peculiar linguistic structures in these communication systems can be regarded as proof
of their linguistic nature.
Data from an American home-signer (Franklin et al., 2011) suggests that home-sign
languages possess structure-building devices, even for negation and questions:
We argue that the home-sign system we studied possesses lexical items
corresponding to negation and question, and that, in employing them, the system
applies syntactic modifications of the kind just described. (Franklin et al., 2011,
p. 399)
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It is of paramount importance at this point, to show the linguistic nature of home-sign
systems, to assess the intrinsic symbolic nature of negation. Psycholinguistic studies
can help us to reach this goal. By looking at first-language learning in infancy, we can
identify (see Dimroth, 2010 for a review) three steps in the acquisition of linguistic
negation: 1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/nonexistence/unfulfilled expectation;
3) denial.
According to many studies (Choi, 1988; Pea, 1980; Volterra & Antinucci, 1979),
rejection is the first category of negation to be acquired. Children use ‘no’ to express
refusal of something existing in their present context. However, we can find examples
of rejection in human pre-linguistic gestures and even in animal behavior. In fact,
before the time children start to produce the single word ‘no’ to express rejection, they
have already expressed rejection non-linguistically. Rejection, according to Pea (1980),
does not require a symbolic representation, while nonexistence and denial do require
them. Indeed, rejection can be considered as the expression of an emotional mood
towards an object or action present in that context. Children do not need to have a
symbolic representation of that object or action in their minds. By rejecting the object
or action, they are only expressing their feelings towards them.
The second category of linguistic negation to arise is disappearance/nonexistence/
unfulfilled expectation. At this point, children are able to signal the absence or
disappearance of an expected referent in the context of speech or to indicate
something that violates their expectations, based on previous experience (for instance,
malfunctioning toys). This kind of negation requires a symbolic representation.
Indeed, in this case, the object or action or person that the linguistic negation is
addressing is not present in the here-and-now context. Negation, hence, is not acting
on something present in the context, but on a representation of something.
Lastly, the third category to be acquired is denial. To deny, children must have the
ability to discern between their own knowledge of the world and the knowledge of
their listener (Bloom, 1979). In order to deny a sentence, children have to manage two
propositions, one affirming and one negating the same predication; and they have to
ascribe one of them to the person they are speaking to. In the case of denial, the object,
action, or person addressed by the negation is not physically present in the context.
Mainly, negation addresses a belief attributed to the interlocutor that expresses a
counterfactual state of affairs. Interestingly, according to Franklin et al. (2011), all of
the three categories of negation (rejection, nonexistence, and even denial) were
produced in the home-sign system of David, the deaf child of their study. He produced
gestures (mostly side-to-side headshakes) that functioned like sentential negative
markers that have a fixed position at the beginning of the sentences.
At this point we return to the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study to look more closely at
what they say about displacement in a home-sign system:
Converging evidence comes from research on a deaf-born child of hearing parents.
Without exposure to conventional language, this child developed a communication
system that also included acts of displaced reference (Butcher, Mylander, & Goldin-
Meadow, 1991). In human evolution, referential acts were presumably used initially
for indicating perceptible objects and events, so going beyond this required further
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representational skills and the ability to track relevant common ground in social
interaction. The ontogenetic primacy of the ability to communicate about absent
entities demonstrates that it is not dependent on, but rather foundational to,
language. (Liszkowski et al., 2009, p. 659)
According to Liszkowski et al. (2009), displacement is not dependent on, but rather
foundational to language, and the observation of displaced gestures in home-sign
systems supports this hypothesis. However, data from the Franklin et al. (2011) study
showed that home-sign systems have structure-building devices for negation and
questions, and even for the more complex forms of negation. Then, with these
premises, following Liszkowski et al.’s argument, it should be concluded that complex
forms of negation and questions do not rely on language but instead are foundational
to language. But this conclusion is too strong, and the argument of displacement
gesture in home-sign systems should be rejected. Displacement gestures produced in
home-sign systems are symbolic, according to the definition of symbolic gestures
previously proposed, and the symbolic nature of home-sign systems relies on the
faculty of language.
On the other hand, it is widely accepted in the psycholinguistic literature that ‘no’,
expressing the function of nonexistence, is one of the first words children learn to say.
It is reasonable to claim that the displacement gestures in the Liszkowski et al. study
predate and predict the expression of nonexistence that is later expressed in
conventional language. Indeed, by using a displacement gesture, infants are
communicating something about an absent referent. Thus, the displacement gesture
is the first symbolic expression that allows for the acknowledgment of nonexistence.
Nonexistence could not be expressed without displacement. Then, displacement can
be considered foundational to negation. Without displacement, negation would
always be anchored to the here-and-now context. Thus, we may hypothesize that
without displacement, only the first and simplest category of negation would have
come out. Intentional displacement, on the other hand, depends on the faculty of
language. And, indeed, no communication system other than human language has
intentional displacement and complex forms of negation.
In a recent paper, Liszkowski et al. (2012) consider pointing gesture as a
prelinguistic and language-independent basis for language. If this can be considered
true in the case of concrete pointing, it does not hold true in the case of abstract
pointing, which can only be understood by relying on the same processes as those
involved in language comprehension. It does not matter if the first linguistic
expression is a word or a gesture (i.e., an abstract pointing). In any case, we are already
in the linguistic game. Displacement, according to this analysis, is grounded in our
species-specific faculty of language, which can only be properly manifested in a
cultural community. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the abstract pointing
gesture in the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study is an instantiation of symbolic and
linguistic communication.
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6. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Liszkowski et al. study does not support the claim that displacement
gestures do not depend on language. Displacement seems to be a symbolic operation
tied to language, even in preverbal infant gestures. The expression of intentional
displacement cannot be considered foundational to language because it already
requires all of the processes involved in the interpretation of linguistic
communication. In other words, when children intentionally express displacement,
even in the gestural modality, they are already beyond the boundary of language.
Significantly, displacement gestures seem to be linked to linguistic negation and
predate the expression of nonexistence. Moreover, and most importantly, the
expression of displacement seems to be a necessary condition for the acquisition of the
more complex forms of negation. Without displacement, negation could not go
beyond the here-and-now context. Thus, displacement is foundational to the complex
forms of negation, and the expression of displacement in gestural communication
predates and predicts the expression of complex negative structures.
Note
[1] Although both authors discussed and designed the article together, sections 3, 4, and 5 were
written by Valentina Cuccio, while section 2 was written by Marco Carapezza. Sections 1 and
6 were written jointly by both authors.
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